The War Department and the General Staff

Until September of 1947, everything having to do with warfare and National

Defense was over-seen by something known as the War Department. A straightforward

title if there ever was one. The Generals sitting on the War Department

General Staff (WDGS), ran both the "Great Wars". In fact, the WDGS/Air Staff was

created in 1917...World War I.

The Air wing of the Army had played a crucial role in the outcome of WW2.

Against that there can be no argument. Before WWII was over, the President and

the General Staff had both expected that a permanent Air Force would, at some

point, be created. The importance of air power had been thoroughly promoted by

WWI General, Billy Mitchell, a hero and yet a victim of the intensity of his own

beliefs. General Mitchell’s “spirit” was carried on through General Henry H.

Arnold. At War’s end, General Arnold convinced his friend, General Carl Spaatz, to

take the reigns. He knew his friend would guarantee the new Air Force would

become reality. General Spaatz became Air Force Chief of Staff, and then retired in

April, 1948...mission accomplished.

Also planned-ahead-of-time was a Central Intelligence organization, to over-see

and coordinate Intelligence for the member services of the new National Military

Establishment and for the President. The Central Intelligence Group was formed in

1946, but existed in the shadow of the coming civilian Agency, which was made

official with the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA1947).

As the CIG was coming together, the war time intelligence apparatus, the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS), was abolished. Most of those involved with these

changes realized too late that it’s closure was premature and so a temporary

counter Intelligence agency was assembled, known as the Strategic Services Unit

(SSU). This was placed within the new Central Intelligence Group. The CIG had

been chiefly an Army group, under the thumb of the WDGS and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff -a seemingly natural extension of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

Growing Pains

The new civilian agency would need to replicate offices and services that already

existed within the Army Intelligence framework. And, as far as the Army was

concerned, it all worked just fine the way it was, thank you very much!

Tensions between the Army and the new Central Intelligence Agency were

obvious and immediate. In the archived historical material available, it can be

seen that the Army was accused, repeatedly, by the CIA Director, Admiral Roscoe

H. Hillenkoetter, of not sharing some of the most crucial Intelligence material, with

him. To be fair, the Army had good reasons to be wary of sharing too much

information with the untested, green "civilian" agency. It had taken many years to

develop the contacts and resources that helped win the war. But if our new

National Security apparatus was to succeed, all of the different groups would have

to be brought together, somehow. The new Secretary of Defense, James V.

Forrestal, was tasked by President Truman to do just that. He had to find a way to

unite all of these agencies.

As seen in Admiral Hillenkoetter's diary, for 1948 and 1949, the DCIA was still

complaining to Army ID heads, General Chamberlin and then General Alex Bolling,

about the same problem. Though General Bolling would always seem sympathetic

and on the side of Hillenkoetter, it would not appear to pan out that way, later.

There were situations where the Army didn't share Intelligence with the Deputy

Director, Edwin Wright, either. Again, General Bolling seemed to understand and

seemed unaware of the problem.

25 March 1948

Historians note that by March of 1948, we experienced what has been referred to

as the "March War Scare". Events prompted by the Soviet Union had put our

leaders in alert mode, with some of them appearing more alert than others. Three

individuals stand out from the rest. Their dramatic exhibition in front of the

Armed Services Committee and President Truman, on 25 March 1948, to many

people, appeared as “over the top politicking”. Defense Secretary Forrestal and

Navy Secretary Sullivan pressed the issue, making it sound as if World War III was

going to break out at any second. Secretary Sullivan brought up the fact that

enemy submarines had possibly been sighted off the California coast, on that very

morning! Some journalists accused both Secretaries of being alarmists -

unscrupulously fanning war hysteria in order to gain extra funding.

25 March 1948...the same day...Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz,

declared a 24 hour-a-day air defense emergency! His orders were that everything

we had was to be brought out and put into service, if possible. He was under the

impression (for some reason) that the Soviets were about to launch a surprise

attack, on the Continental United States. Several of our other leaders, both in the

Defense sector and the Intelligence Community, scoffed at the idea. They didn't

seem to have a clue as to what General Spaatz was going on about.

In response to General Spaatz's order and the resulting confusion within the

Intelligence Community, the Global Survey Group, within the Office of Reports and

Estimates (ORE), was tasked by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to begin

an immediate study, to find out if it was feasible that the Russians were planning

an attack. The first report to come out of this series of studies was Office of

Reports and Estimates study 22-48 (ORE 22-48). This meant GS/Special Ad Hoc Study 22, in

the year 1948.

More special studies ensued, and each time they came to the same conclusion:

no viable threat from the Soviets throughout 1948.

So if the Soviet Union was not to blame for General Spaatz's emergency, what

was? What indeed was all the fuss about? Trying to pin down the exact cause of

the emergency has been difficult. Was something indeed sighted, which caused

the alarm, but perhaps had little to do with submarines or Russian attackers?

There is one subject which, although controversial, could explain this mystery.

Flying Saucers and Unconventional Aircraft

Right after the war's end, our country began experiencing a series of sightings of

unconventional aerial vehicles. They became known as Flying Saucers and Flying

Discs. The Army was reported in the Press of the day as "looking into" the saucer

phenomenon. The investigations grew over the years, beginning in 1947.

During the month of March 1948, many strange airborne craft were again being

sighted, across the Country. Could one of these flying objects have been the cause

of the alarm on the 25th? There was nothing found in the so-called Blue Book

files, after several careful searches. Nothing seemed to point to a specific event on

that Thursday morning, of the 25th. Even so, the official directives for Flying Discs

were updated on that day. By updated I mean that the date of issuance was

changed to match a particular report. This was probably a way to re-enforce the

fact that the particular directive in question was still in effect, as of such-and-such

date.

These official directives were: Air Defense Command, Strategic Air Command and

Tactical Air Command Letter 45-5 and Air Force and SAC Regulation, 200-1:

Reporting of Information on Flying Discs.

ADC 45-5 appears to have had its inception on 6 February 1948. It was then

“updated” or reissued with the date of 25 February. Then, on 25 March, they were

again re-issued, only this time they were accompanied by the US Army General

Staff issuing their own directive, on that same day. Colonel Riley F. Ennis, who at

the time was Chief/Intelligence Group, authored the directive: Reporting of

Information on Unconventional Aircraft.

The directive ordered personnel to use the filing mechanism 452.1 with a Top

Secret Control: A-1917.

So, instead of finding Russian aggressors on the verge of a US invasion it seems

more likely that it was the Flying Discs themselves, which had set the Air Staff off!

But why...and why on that particular day? Disc related or not, it is clear that

something happened on that Thursday morning.

Connections to the Aztec Flying Disc Incident story?

Instead of attempting to beg for belief in eyewitness testimony, I would instead

simply point out that groups of individuals with no prior contact with any other of

the witnesses, have recited the same date to researchers, 25 March 1948. One

witness cannot be certain that was the actual date, but he does say it could be,

because it was in that time frame.

My point is, why would any of these people be saying this took place on that

specific date, when you can see in available historical material that something

important must have indeed occurred that day? How would they have known?

These people who have said they knew for certain a disc landed in Hart Canyon,

on a mesa, near Cedar Hill, which is North East of Aztec, New Mexico, weren’t

researching air defense history. I happened upon the information when I was

reading material about the Semi Automated Ground Environment (SAGE), the air

defense system which was more than just partly responsible for our entry into the

digital computer age.