CIA confirmed: no bombers on 25 March 1948
As you can see from "Air Information Report" from August, they were very aware of aircraft movement. Manufacturing informational awareness was also high on their list of priorities.
CIA confirmed: no bombers on 25 March 1948
As you can see from "Air Information Report" from August, they were very aware of aircraft movement. Manufacturing informational awareness was also high on their list of priorities.
The CIA Act of 1948
[new doc added 7/11 and 7/25]
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal pleaded before the Armed Services Committee that day of 25 March 1948. Part of his alarming report to them dealt with the need to re-vamp and upgrade of the official orders and authorizations for the Central Intelligence Agency. House of Representatives Bill 5871 and Senate Bill 2306 were known, collectively, as the CIA Act of 1948.
In these modern times, it is still common to see this little bit of history ignored...even by the Company, itself. Instead, we may discuss anything else, such as the CIA Act of April 1949, but not 25 March 1948 and the CIA Act of 1948. Why is that? You can find it if you search hard enough, but it is more generally ignored.
Congress asked for a detailed reason for the need, and the next day, on the 26th, Deputy Director of the CIA, Brig. General Wright produced a response.
Source: CIA FOIA On-Line Reading Room
The key issue was a provision authorizing the CIA to conduct operations in which the funds and operators (be it financial, industrial or government)could be kept completely a secret. In other words, they didn't even need to report it through standard Top Secret Control procedures. It is almost as if something happened on that Thursday morning that put some in the Intelligence Community, be it Army, Navy, Air Force or other, in a position where they could not say what they were doing or what it cost or who was used in the operation. Instead, we get the CIA Act of 1948.
Here is the internal memo that General Wright penned having to do with the reasons for the 25 March upgrade.
All I can verify so far is that it pertains to this non disclosure aspect of certain highly sensitive operations and their financing, as confirmed by later memos from the 30th.
This memo, from 2 April, sheds the most light on the Deputy Director's 25 March memo.
The March "War Scare" of 1948
The document, in full, I drew my information from, for this post, can be read by going to the CIA's online library, and putting this link into the search engine: DOC 0000609096. I put together an edited version by way of jpg files that demonstrate the salient points.
Note, please, that Colonel Riley F. Ennis is seen as an important contributor to the over-all image presented that shows NO Soviet invasion plans. It was written by William R. Harris, in 1966. The stress seems to have begun with a message written by General Clay, where he puts forth the information that the Soviets are poised to strike, on 5 March, 1948. It leads to the CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) beginning a series of studies on Soviet intentions.
CIA confirmed: no bombers on 25 March 1948 As you can see from "Air Information Report" from August, they were very aware of ...