The March "War Scare" of 1948

The document, in full, I drew my information from, for this post, can be read by going to the CIA's online library, and putting this link into the search engine: DOC 0000609096. I put together an edited version by way of jpg files that demonstrate the salient points.

Note, please, that Colonel Riley F. Ennis is seen as an important contributor to the over-all image presented that shows NO Soviet invasion plans. It was written by William R. Harris, in 1966. The stress seems to have begun with a message written by General Clay, where he puts forth the information that the Soviets are poised to strike, on 5 March, 1948. It leads to the CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) beginning a series of studies on Soviet intentions.

             25 March 1948 and the Air Defense Emergency

                                     PART ONE

In Mr. Steinman and Colonel Steven's book on Aztec, it is written that General Marshall declared an emergency on 25 march 1948 which was then rescinded later that same day.

After careful research it was found that there was indeed an emergency declared that day...but not by General Marshall. It was an 24 hour a day air defense emergency, declared by Chief of Staff of the new Air Force, General Carl Spaatz. This makes much more sense, as he was CS of the AF and General Marshall was then head of the State Department. The State Department would not be the ones to declare an air emergency.

It was also found that it was NOT rescinded that same day. The emergency lasted until April, after the new Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, rescinded it. Actually, it was one of the General's first actions as CS. 

source: The Emerging Shield, the Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945-1960, by Kenneth Schaffel, 1953-1988, for the Office of Air Force History, Pages 77,78 beginning with Paragraph 4 on Page 77:

    After moving from the west coast to participate in the war games, the 505th was expected to remain in the east. ADC planned to concentrate its meager radar warning and control resources in the northeastern United States pending approval and funding of the Radar Fence Plan, but its plans were abruptly and drastically altered late in March 1948. With no advanced warning, Headquarters USAF directed that an emergency air defense system be established to operate around the clock in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. Shortly after, First Air Force in the east was ordered to put its fighter units on alert. The usefulness of this move was uncertain since First Air Force did not yet control the services of the 505th and thus lacked any type of radar warning and control capability. 119

These events began Thursday, March 25, when Spaatz suddenly informed the Air Staff that he wanted Alaskan air defenses "augmented" immediately.120 

The following day, a top secret message over his signature went to Alaskan Air Command directing it to 'place existing radar warning [units] on continuously operating basis by 4 April.'121

Skipping to last paragraph on page 78:

Spaatz initiated emergency air defense measures in March 1948 for a number of reasons. First, it is clear that, contrary to the views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (established in 1947 under the provisions of the National Security Act) and by the intelligence divisions of the Army and Navy, Air Force intelligence believed the United States in danger of surprise attack from the Soviet Union.

      119 History, 1AF, Jan-Jun 1948, 120 HQ USAF Interstaff memo, Brig Gen                    Edward J. Timberlake to Maj Gen Samuel E.  Anderson, Mar 25, 1948  121 Ibid.                                                                     

A cross checking with other historical works on our air defense, by reputable researchers, it was found that only Captain Schaffel's team noted the 25 March date. Others used the 26th, the 27th or the 28th. But as the reader can see, there is a notation provided by Schaffel in the form of an inter-staff memo. For instance, in the well known work: Searching the Skies, by Winkler and Webster,* they write: 

As Project SUPREMACY was undergoing consideration, relations with the Soviet Union continued to sour. In February 1948, there was a Communist coup in Czechoslavakia. In China, Communist forces continued to gain ground against Chiang Kai-shek. Air Force intelligence warned that the Soviets were preparing to conduct a surprise attack. On March 27, 1948, General Spaatz, concerned about the vulnerability of the Atomic Energy Commission plant at Hanford, Washington, ordered the recently placed ADC radars at Arlington, Spokane, Neah Bay, and Hanford, Washington, and at Portland, Oregon, to begin operating on a 24-hour basis. Due to insufficient personnel and material resources, round-the-clock operations in the northwest proved beyond ADC's capability. Despite these problems, ADC was ordered to take AN/CPS-5 and AN/TPS-1B/1D radar sets out of storage for operation in the northeast and in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

 I contacted Archie Defaunte at the Air Force History Museum and asked him about the incident, and the interstaff memo. He agreed to do a search. He and his team spent the entire weekend looking for the memo but could not locate it. I had also asked for March 1948 air accident reports which he was able to produce and he sent that on to me.

*Searching the Skies, the Legacy of the United States Cold War Defense Radar Program, by United States Air Force, Air Combat Command, June 1997  Authors credited: David F. Winkler and Julie L. Webster Performing Organization: U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratories (USACERL) Special Report 97/78 

    

 

                   Colonel Riley F. Ennis and the Intelligence Group

On 25 March 1948 the Army General Staff's Intelligence Group published a Letter of Instruction on Flying Discs, re-asserting the filing system of 452.1 for Unconventional aircraft, but also creating a Top Secret Control: A-1917.

According to Special Regulations 10-120-1, 14 September 1949, Organization and Functions: Department of the Army Intelligence Division, General Staff  [Robert Bolin , depositor University of Nebraska - Lincoln, rbolin2@unl.edu],  the Intelligence Group 

"...a. Insures that the Army and other agencies have timely notification of event immediately affecting the security of the United States or its forces. b. Collects intelligence information from Army field agencies, receives information from other intelligence agencies, and distributes information received-both within the Army and to other agencies."

                                          Cincinnati Enquirer for the weekend of the 27th

In Denmark, people have been alerted for possible illegal coastal landings. On Friday night Copenhagen searchlights snapped on because of reports of unidentified objects in the sky. Nothing was sighted.

 The War Department and the General Staff

Until September of 1947, everything having to do with warfare and National

Defense was over-seen by something known as the War Department. A straightforward

title if there ever was one. The Generals sitting on the War Department

General Staff (WDGS), ran both the "Great Wars". In fact, the WDGS/Air Staff was

created in 1917...World War I.

The Air wing of the Army had played a crucial role in the outcome of WW2.

Against that there can be no argument. Before WWII was over, the President and

the General Staff had both expected that a permanent Air Force would, at some

point, be created. The importance of air power had been thoroughly promoted by

WWI General, Billy Mitchell, a hero and yet a victim of the intensity of his own

beliefs. General Mitchell’s “spirit” was carried on through General Henry H.

Arnold. At War’s end, General Arnold convinced his friend, General Carl Spaatz, to

take the reigns. He knew his friend would guarantee the new Air Force would

become reality. General Spaatz became Air Force Chief of Staff, and then retired in

April, 1948...mission accomplished.

Also planned-ahead-of-time was a Central Intelligence organization, to over-see

and coordinate Intelligence for the member services of the new National Military

Establishment and for the President. The Central Intelligence Group was formed in

1946, but existed in the shadow of the coming civilian Agency, which was made

official with the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA1947).

As the CIG was coming together, the war time intelligence apparatus, the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS), was abolished. Most of those involved with these

changes realized too late that it’s closure was premature and so a temporary

counter Intelligence agency was assembled, known as the Strategic Services Unit

(SSU). This was placed within the new Central Intelligence Group. The CIG had

been chiefly an Army group, under the thumb of the WDGS and the Joint Chiefs of

Staff -a seemingly natural extension of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

Growing Pains

The new civilian agency would need to replicate offices and services that already

existed within the Army Intelligence framework. And, as far as the Army was

concerned, it all worked just fine the way it was, thank you very much!

Tensions between the Army and the new Central Intelligence Agency were

obvious and immediate. In the archived historical material available, it can be

seen that the Army was accused, repeatedly, by the CIA Director, Admiral Roscoe

H. Hillenkoetter, of not sharing some of the most crucial Intelligence material, with

him. To be fair, the Army had good reasons to be wary of sharing too much

information with the untested, green "civilian" agency. It had taken many years to

develop the contacts and resources that helped win the war. But if our new

National Security apparatus was to succeed, all of the different groups would have

to be brought together, somehow. The new Secretary of Defense, James V.

Forrestal, was tasked by President Truman to do just that. He had to find a way to

unite all of these agencies.

As seen in Admiral Hillenkoetter's diary, for 1948 and 1949, the DCIA was still

complaining to Army ID heads, General Chamberlin and then General Alex Bolling,

about the same problem. Though General Bolling would always seem sympathetic

and on the side of Hillenkoetter, it would not appear to pan out that way, later.

There were situations where the Army didn't share Intelligence with the Deputy

Director, Edwin Wright, either. Again, General Bolling seemed to understand and

seemed unaware of the problem.

25 March 1948

Historians note that by March of 1948, we experienced what has been referred to

as the "March War Scare". Events prompted by the Soviet Union had put our

leaders in alert mode, with some of them appearing more alert than others. Three

individuals stand out from the rest. Their dramatic exhibition in front of the

Armed Services Committee and President Truman, on 25 March 1948, to many

people, appeared as “over the top politicking”. Defense Secretary Forrestal and

Navy Secretary Sullivan pressed the issue, making it sound as if World War III was

going to break out at any second. Secretary Sullivan brought up the fact that

enemy submarines had possibly been sighted off the California coast, on that very

morning! Some journalists accused both Secretaries of being alarmists -

unscrupulously fanning war hysteria in order to gain extra funding.

25 March 1948...the same day...Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz,

declared a 24 hour-a-day air defense emergency! His orders were that everything

we had was to be brought out and put into service, if possible. He was under the

impression (for some reason) that the Soviets were about to launch a surprise

attack, on the Continental United States. Several of our other leaders, both in the

Defense sector and the Intelligence Community, scoffed at the idea. They didn't

seem to have a clue as to what General Spaatz was going on about.

In response to General Spaatz's order and the resulting confusion within the

Intelligence Community, the Global Survey Group, within the Office of Reports and

Estimates (ORE), was tasked by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to begin

an immediate study, to find out if it was feasible that the Russians were planning

an attack. The first report to come out of this series of studies was Office of

Reports and Estimates study 22-48 (ORE 22-48). This meant GS/Special Ad Hoc Study 22, in

the year 1948.

More special studies ensued, and each time they came to the same conclusion:

no viable threat from the Soviets throughout 1948.

So if the Soviet Union was not to blame for General Spaatz's emergency, what

was? What indeed was all the fuss about? Trying to pin down the exact cause of

the emergency has been difficult. Was something indeed sighted, which caused

the alarm, but perhaps had little to do with submarines or Russian attackers?

There is one subject which, although controversial, could explain this mystery.

Flying Saucers and Unconventional Aircraft

Right after the war's end, our country began experiencing a series of sightings of

unconventional aerial vehicles. They became known as Flying Saucers and Flying

Discs. The Army was reported in the Press of the day as "looking into" the saucer

phenomenon. The investigations grew over the years, beginning in 1947.

During the month of March 1948, many strange airborne craft were again being

sighted, across the Country. Could one of these flying objects have been the cause

of the alarm on the 25th? There was nothing found in the so-called Blue Book

files, after several careful searches. Nothing seemed to point to a specific event on

that Thursday morning, of the 25th. Even so, the official directives for Flying Discs

were updated on that day. By updated I mean that the date of issuance was

changed to match a particular report. This was probably a way to re-enforce the

fact that the particular directive in question was still in effect, as of such-and-such

date.

These official directives were: Air Defense Command, Strategic Air Command and

Tactical Air Command Letter 45-5 and Air Force and SAC Regulation, 200-1:

Reporting of Information on Flying Discs.

ADC 45-5 appears to have had its inception on 6 February 1948. It was then

“updated” or reissued with the date of 25 February. Then, on 25 March, they were

again re-issued, only this time they were accompanied by the US Army General

Staff issuing their own directive, on that same day. Colonel Riley F. Ennis, who at

the time was Chief/Intelligence Group, authored the directive: Reporting of

Information on Unconventional Aircraft.

The directive ordered personnel to use the filing mechanism 452.1 with a Top

Secret Control: A-1917.

So, instead of finding Russian aggressors on the verge of a US invasion it seems

more likely that it was the Flying Discs themselves, which had set the Air Staff off!

But why...and why on that particular day? Disc related or not, it is clear that

something happened on that Thursday morning.

Connections to the Aztec Flying Disc Incident story?

Instead of attempting to beg for belief in eyewitness testimony, I would instead

simply point out that groups of individuals with no prior contact with any other of

the witnesses, have recited the same date to researchers, 25 March 1948. One

witness cannot be certain that was the actual date, but he does say it could be,

because it was in that time frame.

My point is, why would any of these people be saying this took place on that

specific date, when you can see in available historical material that something

important must have indeed occurred that day? How would they have known?

These people who have said they knew for certain a disc landed in Hart Canyon,

on a mesa, near Cedar Hill, which is North East of Aztec, New Mexico, weren’t

researching air defense history. I happened upon the information when I was

reading material about the Semi Automated Ground Environment (SAGE), the air

defense system which was more than just partly responsible for our entry into the

digital computer age.